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Recent studies demonstrate that effective healthcare can benefit from using the human ge-
nomic information. For instance, analysis of tumor genomes has revealed 140 genes whose
mutations contribute to cancer 1. As a result, many institutions are using statistical anal-
ysis of genomic data, which are mostly based on genome-wide association studies (GWAS).
GWAS analyze genome sequence variations in order to identify genetic risk factors for dis-
eases. These studies often require pooling data from different sources together in order to
unravel statistical patterns or relationships between genetic variants and diseases. In this
case, the primary challenge is to fulfill one major objective: accessing multiple genomic data
repositories for collaborative research in a privacy-preserving manner. Due to the sensitivity
and privacy concerns regarding the genomic data, multi-jurisdictional laws and policies of
cross-border genomic data sharing are enforced among different regions of the world. In
this article, we present SAFETY, a hybrid framework, which can securely perform GWAS
on federated genomic datasets using homomorphic encryption and recently introduced se-
cure hardware component of Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) 2 to ensure high
efficiency and privacy at the same time. Different experimental settings show the efficacy
and applicability of such hybrid framework in secure conduction of GWAS. To the best of
our knowledge, this hybrid use of homomorphic encryption along with Intel SGX is not pro-
posed or experimented to this date. Our proposed framework, SAFETY is up to 4.82 times
faster than the best existing secure computation technique.
1 Introduction
Rapid advancement in human genome sequencing has led us to a genomic era where human ge-
nomic data play an ever-important role in clinical research 3. As cost-effective and efficient genome
sequencing technologies are readily available, the research community can conduct experiments on
different genomic data repositories for scientific discovery 4. As a result of this massive data avail-
ability, Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) are gaining popularity as they answer critical
questions like susceptibility towards a disease or a physical trait by analyzing genome sequence
variations in different individuals. GWAS examine genetic architecture of a disease to identify
genetic risk factors associated with it. In other words, GWAS aims at finding if there are any cor-
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relations between a certain gene and a specific disease. Another fundamental goal of GWAS is to
identify biological factors responsible for disease susceptibility in order to develop more effective
diagnosis, treatment, and prevention techniques.
A larger genomic dataset is quintessential to perform any analytical study such as GWAS.
Different research organizations or healthcare facilities often sequence genomes of different pa-
tients or participants for this reason. Researchers are interested in executing queries over these
massive genomic datasets for unraveling new pieces of information about diseases under study.
Oftentimes, the accuracy of this evaluation relies on the quantity and quality of the data used in the
analysis– but a single organization often does not possess adequate genomic data (collection, pro-
cessing, and storing of large-scale data is non-trivial) to perform a comprehensive or meaningful
experiment. Because more data can reduce the sampling errors and improve the power of the anal-
ysis (for instance, statistical strength of GWAS increases with the quantity of data 5), organizations
tend to collect as much data as possible to meet data analysis needs.
Because sharing genomic data in plaintext possesses serious privacy implications for the
participants 6, in addition to the approval from an institutional review board (IRB), collaborative
research on shared genomic data often needs to satisfy two criteria at the same time — a) autho-
rizing access to genomic data for research and b) preserving participants’ privacy and protecting
the confidentiality of their genomic information 7. That is why strict policies regarding genomic
data sharing have been enforced, and generally, these policies are different in different regions of
the world. This difference in the regulations of cross-border genomic data sharing greatly impedes
international research projects 8. It is imperative to address the reality challenge with practical
solutions to promote health science discoveries.
Contributions. In this paper, we propose a hybrid framework, SAFETY, for secure execution of
some popular statistical tests used in GWAS in a federated environment. Our proposed hybrid
model incorporates security and efficiency of two different cryptographic schemes in a single sys-
tem. More precisely, it is the first attempt to infuse homomorphic encryption with SGX to develop
a secure and scalable genomic data computation model. The experimental results clearly demon-
strate that it performs consistently irrespective of the number of data owners making it highly
scalable (see Section 2 for details). This hybrid model captures the essence of both techniques:
ability of computing some functions on encrypted data (homomorphic encryption) and performing
sophisticated mathematical operation in the secure execution area of a SGX enabled CPU. Our pri-
mary goal behind proposing a hybrid model relies on better security guarantee from existing secure
computation schemes, and faster and scalable execution for any number of data owners. From our
experimental results, it is evident that the proposed hybrid model provides better efficiency and
security than pure secure hardware or homomorphic encryption based solutions.
SAFETY utilizes an architecture 9 to execute secure count query on federated genomic
datasets. Similar federated architectures are available in literature 10, 11. In our adopted archi-
tecture 9, 12, genomic data resides in the local premises of individual data owners in plaintext (see
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Figure 1). Data owners have their own database systems which are geographically distributed and
have different policy compliance for the data usage. An overview of data representation for each
data owner is shown in Table 1. Proper authentication allows any researcher to execute queries on
their data.
Among the existing secure computation techniques, SGX is most efficient (existing tech-
niques are described in supplementary document). For instance, an implementation of SGX-based
MapReduce framework 13 shows a very modest overhead of 8% to achieve read/write integrity.
This is a great advantage of SGX in comparison to other secure computation schemes like garbled
circuit and homomorphic encryption, which generally increase the computational overhead thou-
sands of times 14. However, our proposed hybrid model is 1.7 to 4.82 times faster than SGX (see
Section 2). This comparative efficiency increases with the number of data owners. The contribu-
tions of this article are summarized as follows:
1. We propose a hybrid cryptographic framework, SAFETY, which uses homomorphic encryp-
tion along with secure hardware features of the Intel SGX. SAFETY is not only secure and
efficient, but also overcomes the limitations of solely homomorphic encryption based so-
lutions which often come with higher computational overhead for processing higher order
polynomials. In addition, SAFETY also simplifies solely SGX based solutions, which re-
quire pairwise attestation and secure key distributions between server and data owners.
2. Using SAFETY, we securely execute and evaluate some of the major functions of GWAS
in federated architecture where genomic data are distributed and owned by different parties.
We performed four statistical tests: Linkage Disequilibrium (LD), Hardy-Weinberg Equi-
librium (HWE), Cochran-Armitage Test for Trend (CATT), Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) to
evaluate SAFETY over a variety of settings. However, our framework SAFETY can incor-
porate any GWAS functions (i.e., transmission disequilibrium test 14, EigenSTRAT 15, linear
mixed model 16, etc.) and not limited to the GWAS functions mentioned previously. The
methodology to perform these statistical tests securely is discussed in Section 3.
3. SAFETY ensures that each data owner is completely unaware of the contributions from the
other data owners, who are participating in the same analysis. Moreover, the final result is
revealed only to the researchers without disclosing individual contribution of data owners.
This allows us to preserve the privacy of the output of each data owner.
4. We conduct multiple experiments in different realistic setting in a federated environment
varying the data size and the geographic locations of data owners (see Section 2 for details).
2 Results
In this section, we extensively evaluate aforementioned hybrid approach and secure hardware based
approach in a federated environment using Amazon cloud and demonstrate their applicability in a
3
Figure 1: Block diagram of the federated architecture where data owners are geographically
distributed.
real world setting. Our proposed framework SAFETY is based on hybrid approach where we use
SGX along with homomorphic encryption. However, secure hardware based approach uses only
SGX. See Section 3 for more details.
System Architecture The proposed system as shown in Figure 1 has four main entities:
• Researchers (authorized): Individuals or organizations who want to execute queries over
genomic databases. This party sends their queries to the central server and expect different
encrypted results of different GWAS functions.
• Data Owners: These parties are geographically distributed and possess databases upon
which queries are performed. Data owners might be hospitals or government organizations
who want to share their genomic data and have different policies regarding the data shar-
ing. The proposed model supports any number of data owners where they can execute any
aggregate query locally.
• Crypto Service Provider (CSP): It manages the cryptographic keys that will be used for data
encryption and decryption in different stages of our system. Each data owner receives a
public key from the CSP and uses it to encrypt its outputs. CSP also issues the private key to
an authorized researcher who can decrypt the final result.
• Central Server: The central server communicates with all the other entities. It receives
queries from the researcher, forwards them to all data owners and collects individual en-
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Table 1: Data representation in each party
Sequence
# Case rs4426 rs4305 rs4630 Cancer
Data
Owner 1
1 CC CT GG . . . Negative
2 CT CT AG . . . Negative
3 CC CT GG . . . Negative
Data
Owner 2
1 CC CT GG . . . Negative
2 CT CC GG . . . Positive
3 CC CT GG . . . Positive
Data
Owner 3
1 CT CC AG . . . Positive
2 CT CT AG . . . Negative
3 TT CC GG . . . Positive
Data
Owner 4
1 TT CC AA . . . Positive
2 CC CC GG . . . Positive
3 CC CT GG . . . Positive
crypted results from each data owners. Individual encrypted results from data owners are
securely combined by the central server to compute the final result of the query with the help
of homomorphic encryption and SGX.
Table 2: Server locations and average latency
Server Location IP Address Network Latency (ms)
Canada (Manitoba) 130.179.30.133 <1
USA (Oregon) 52.32.83.223 37
London 52.56.65.221 105
Seoul 52.78.100.194 170
Sydney 54.206.67.251 233
Experimental Settings In our experimental setup, the researcher, CSP, and central server were
located in Manitoba, Canada. Our central server was hosted on a machine with Intel Core i7-6700
(3.40 GHz) processor and 8 GB memory. However, we emulate data owners in different locations
of the world to evaluate the propriety of our proposed framework in a real world environment.
We used Amazon EC2 cloud servers having the same configuration for all data owners. Table
2 shows the location, IP address, and the latency of these servers used in our experiment. In
our experiments, we used 80 bit security (size of the public key is 1024 bits) on the public-key
cryptosystem. The security can be improved by increasing the key length.
We performed four experiments with different settings. The number of data owners was dif-
ferent for different experiments which allowed us to evaluate the scalability of both methods. Table
3 shows different settings used in the experiments. For instance, in experiment 1, two data owners
were in USA and Canada while in experiment 4, five data owners were residing in all the locations
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Table 3: Location of different data owners in different experimental settings
Exp. # Canada USA London Seoul Sydney
Exp. 1 3 3 7 7 7
Exp. 2 3 3 3 7 7
Exp. 3 3 3 3 3 7
Exp. 4 3 3 3 3 3
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4
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Figure 2: Experimental results for plaintext.
mentioned in Table 2. Experiments were performed using synthetic data which were generated
according to the allele frequency of CHB, CHS, JPT and MXL populations from 1000genomes
dataset (August 2010 Release) 17.
Experimental Results Prior to analyzing the running times of our proposed methods, we evaluate
the required time to compute the four statistical tests on plaintext (i.e. without any security protec-
tion). We calculate the exact results for the GWAS calculations without loosing any accuracy.
In Figure 2, we show the running time (in milliseconds) for performing the four statistical
tests on plaintext. We observed that in any single experimental setup, the running time is almost
the same for all the statistical tests. However, running times for different experiments are different
because different experiments involve different number of data owners (as shown in Table 3). As
a result, higher communication overhead is added in these experiments. For instance, experiment
2 involves more data owners than experiment 1, which yields more communication overhead and
results in greater running time.
The running time for computing LD on ciphertexts is shown in Figure 3 (a). Here, running
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(b) Experimental results for HWE
Figure 3: Experimental results for LD and HWE. (a) and (b) compared computation time and
communication costs of conducing Linkage Disequilibrium (LD) and Hardy-Weinberg
Equilibrium (HWE) test using SAFETY and purely secure hardware approach.
time is decomposed into communication overhead in the network and time required for secure
computation of the method. It is noteworthy that,
Communication overhead ∝ Number of data owners
SAFETY requires 5,770 ms to compute LD coefficient for two data owners, which is 1.7 times
faster than secure hardware approach. Rest of the time is due to the communication overhead in
the network. Figure 3(b), 4(a), and 4(b) illustrate the experimental results for performing HWE,
CATT, and FET respectively on ciphertexts. Experimental results illustrate that SAFETY is much
faster than solely secure hardware based approach. For instance, for HWE, SAFETY is 1.93, 2.87,
3.8, and 4.82 times faster than solely secure hardware based approach in Experiment 1, 2, 3, and
4 respectively (see Figure 3(b)). It is noteworthy that SAFETY and the secure h/w approach both
utizlize the asymmetric encryption and decryption.
The experimental results demonstrate that the performance of the secure hardware approach
does not scale well with the number of data owners. As the number of data owner increases, the
running time of secure hardware approach increases rapidly. On the contrary, the hybrid approach
(SAFETY) performs consistently irrespective of the number of data owners due to its hybrid prop-
erties (homomorphic addition followed by computation inside enclave). In this case, only the
communication overhead increases which is very small considering the total running time.
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(a) Experimental results for CATT
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(b) Experimental results for FET
Figure 4: Experimental results for CATT and FET. (a) and (b) compared computation time
and communication costs of conducing Cochran-Armitage Test for Trend (CATT) and
Fishers Exact Test (FET) using SAFETY and purely secure hardware approach.
Another important analysis regarding the methods is the number of decryptions needed for
any statistical tests. It is evident that LD requires more time than HWE while CATT and FET
require more time than the other two. The reason behind this is, the time required to perform a sta-
tistical test is proportional to the number of decryptions required. Moreover, for secure hardware
approach, all the individual contributions of data owners need to be decrypted inside the secure en-
clave. As the number of the data owner increases, the number of decryptions also increases which
results into higher running time. Table 4 demonstrates how the required number of decryptions
increases with the number of data owners.
Table 4: Number of decryptions required to perform a statistical test for different number of data
owners
Test
Number of data owners
One Three Five
Hybrid Secure h/w Hybrid Secure h/w Hybrid Secure h/w
LD 4 4 4 12 4 20
HWE 3 3 3 9 3 15
CATT 6 6 6 18 6 30
FET 6 6 6 18 6 30
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3 Methods
In this section, at first, we introduce some of the concepts, which are required to understand the
proposed methods. Then, we present the threat model. Finally, we discuss how to perform the
statistical tests (LD, HWE, CATT, and FET) securely. Please see the supplementary document for
a brief introduction of the corresponding GWAS functions. To explain our proposed methods we
use the data from Table 1.
As mentioned earlier, we consider the use of Intel SGX in two ways — 1) Hybrid approach: using
Intel SGX along with homomorphic encryption 2) Secure hardware approach: using only Intel
SGX. SAFETY is based on the hybrid approach.
Intel SGX Intel SGX is a set of extensions to the Intel architecture which mainly focuses on the
problem of running applications on a remote machine administered by an untrusted party. SGX
allows parts of an application to be executed inside secure segments of the CPU called enclaves.
Untrusted entities including privileged software (kernel, hypervisor, etc.) cannot access enclave.
SGX ensures that the code and data within an enclave cannot be read or modified from outside the
enclave.
There are two SGX features that play a vital role in provisioning of sensitive data to an
enclave. These are called attestation and sealing.
• Attestation: SGX enclaves are created without privacy-sensitive data. Privacy-sensitive data
are delivered after the enclave has been properly instantiated on the platform. The process
of demonstrating that a piece of software has been properly instantiated within an enclave
on an enabled platform is called attestation 18.
Attestation demonstrates to a user that he is communicating with an application running
inside an enclave. This demonstration is accomplished via a cryptographic signature that
certifies the hash of the enclave’s contents. The remote computer’s administrator is able
to load any program in an enclave. However, the user (who uses the remote computation
service) will deny to load his data into an enclave if the hash of the contents does not match
the desired value 19.
• Sealing: When an enclave is instantiated, SGX provides protections to its data until it is
maintained inside the enclave. However, when the enclave process exits, the enclave will
be destroyed and all associated data will be lost. If the data is required later, it needs to be
stored outside the enclave. Sealing is the process of encrypting and storing data in a way
such that only the same enclave would be able un-seal them back to their original form.
In our framework, data sealing is not required since the data owners do not necessarily
outsource their data to the central server. Instead, they send certain local counts in response
to researcher’s query.
Memory partition in Intel SGX is described in the supplementary document.
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Homomorphic Encryption Homomorphic encryption allows performing computation on encrypted
data without decrypting the data. The scheme was defined soon after RSA in 1978 20 but was in
theory for 30 years. The scheme in a nutshell is: if c1 = ξ(m1) and c2 = ξ(m2) (where m1 and m2
are the plaintexts, c1 and c2 are the ciphertexts, and ξ is any randomized encryption function), we
can perform computation on c1 and c2 and get the same result as if we were computing with m1
and m2.
In SAFETY, we have adopted a partial homomorphic system named Paillier cryptosystem 21.
Paillier cryptosystem has two important properties that we utilized in SAFETY.
• Probabilistic encryption: If we encrypt the same message several times using Paillier cryp-
tosystem, it generates different ciphertexts for the same plaintext.
• Addition homomorphism: For any public key n and arbitrary messages m1, m2,
ξ(m1) + ξ(m2) = (ξ(m1) ∗ ξ(m2))modn2
which denotes that we can do an addition operation over ciphertexts.
Threat Model In this paper, our goal is to ensure the confidentiality of individual contributions
or data from different geographically distributed data owners. Researchers can decrypt only the
final result provided by the central server. We also assume that the central server is a semi-honest
party (also known as honest-but-curious) where it follows the protocol but may attempt to derive
additional information from the server logs or received messages 22.
We assume that the computations (required for statistical tests of GWAS) run in an SGX
enabled central server. SGX architecture facilitates the central server to perform any computations
securely on data provided by multiple data owners. We assume that the processor works properly,
and is not compromised. We entirely trust the design and implementation of SGX including all
cryptographic operations performed by it.
It should be mentioned that there is a limited or controlled side-channel attack 23 proposed
against certain SGX based framework 24 for a specific scenario. We do not consider such side-
channel attacks in this work.
Hybrid Approach (SAFETY) Suppose, there are total n number of data owners (D1, D2, ..., Dn)
connected in the federated environment where a researcher wants to execute a statistical query.
The query result should follow or represent as if the query is being executed on the combined
dataset. Here, each data owner will have their own individual outputs. For example, data owners
D1, D2, . . . , Dn will have outputs x1, x2, . . . , xn respectively. These outputs can be haplotype or
genotype counts (encrypted) for a specific SNP loci based on the query from a researcher.
10
Figure 5: Sequence diagram for the hybrid approach
These outputs are encrypted by the public keys provided beforehand by the CSP. Data owners
get the public keys from the CSP before any computation. The data owners generate their encrypted
outputs c1, c2, . . . , cn (from x1, x2, . . . , xn) using the public keys provided by the CSP and send
them to the central server for further computations.
The central server then performs homomorphic addition on the individual encrypted outputs
c1, c2, . . . , cn with the Paillier cryptosystem 21. After homomorphic addition, it hands over the total
encrypted counts to Intel SGX for further computations required to perform different statistical
tests like LD, HWE, CATT, and FET. Then, the total counts are decrypted inside enclave, and
further computations are also performed inside enclave where no untrusted application can access
these data. The sequence diagram of this protocol is shown in Figure 5.
It is noteworthy that due to the use of homomorphic addition operation, the number of de-
cryptions required to perform statistical tests is greatly reduced (shown in Table 4). Also the
individual contributions from the data owners are secured since their values are encrypted and the
central server can not learn anything. Figure 6 demonstrates the use of homomorphic encryption
and Intel SGX in a hybrid architecture.
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Figure 6: Usage of homomorphic addition in our framework.
Secure Hardware Approach In secure hardware approach, after receiving individual outputs
from different data owners, the central server decrypts them inside the enclave and performs further
computations on plaintext. The fundamental difference between a hybrid approach and a secure
hardware approach is, not using the homomorphic addition on ciphertext. Since in this approach,
all the individual encrypted outputs need to be decrypted, the computational overhead is quite large.
In the following subsections, we discuss the methods for securely performing LD, HWE,
CATT, and FET according to the hybrid approach.
We use the data from Table 1 to explain the methods.
Secure Linkage Disequilibrium (LD) A sample query from researcher regarding LD may look
like: Are rs4305 and rs4630 at linkage disequilibrium?
Both SNPs are bi-allelic. So, there are four possible haplotypes: CA, TA, CG, and TG.
Each data owners send their haplotype counts which are encrypted by Paillier cryptosystem
21. For instance, data owner 1 sends NCA1 = E(1) where the count of CA is 1 and E is the
encryption function. After receiving the encrypted counts of CA from all the data owners, the
central server performs homomorphic addition operation on them to obtain the total encrypted
count for CA. For n data owners,
NCA = NCA1 +NCA2 + . . .+NCAn
Similarly, total count for TA, CG, and TG are computed. Then the central server instantiates a
secure enclave and provisions these encrypted values as an input there. As the decryption key (pri-
vate key) is sealed by the enclave, it can decrypt the counts and calculate the haplotype frequencies.
The haplotype frequencies are calculated in enclave to avoid division of encrypted numbers which
is expensive even in fully homomorphic encryption. Finally, coefficient of the LD is computed and
researcher gets the result of his query from this. We discuss detailed procedure for computing LD
coefficient in supplementary document.
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Secure Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium (HWE) A sample query regarding HWE is: Does HWE
holds at SNP rs4426?
Possible genotypes at SNP rs4426: CC, CT, and TT. Each data owner will send their in-
dividual count for CC, CT, and TT genotypes. After receiving these encrypted genotype counts
from all data owners, the central server performs homomorphic addition operation using Paillier
cryptosystem 21 to obtain total encrypted counts for corresponding genotypes.
Now, all the counts are decrypted inside the enclave to calculate the frequencies PC and PT .
PC is calculated using, PC = nCCn +
1
2
× nCT
n
.
Then, PT = 1 − PC . So, expected counts for CC, CT and TT are nP 2C , 2nPCPT and nP 2T
respectively. Pearson Goodness of Fit Test for HWE is given by:
χ2 =
(nCC − nP 2C)2
nP 2C
+
(nCT − 2nPCPT )2
2nPCPT
+
(nTT − nP 2T )2
nP 2T
Further discussions on HWE are available in supplementary document.
Secure Cochran-Armitage Test for Trend (CATT) A typical query from researcher regarding
CATT is: Determine if CATT can be inferred at rs4426 ?
Possible genotypes at SNP rs4426 are: CC, CT, and TT. For cases and controls (Cancer positives
and negatives respectively), all the data owners send their encrypted genotype counts for both
categories to the central server. Homomorphic addition operations are performed to calculate row
total and column total using Paillier cryptosystem 21. A contingency table needs to be constructed
which is described in the supplementary document. This table is then sent to the enclave where all
these row totals and column totals are decrypted for further computations.
Secure Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) Like CATT, FET also operates on a contingency table. So,
for FET, data flow is similar to CATT. Here, the p − value is calculated in enclave after securely
aggregating the individual encrypted inputs from the data owners. See supplementary document
for further discussions.
Pre-computation table for GWAS As we have seen, all the statistical tests mentioned before
(LD, HWE, CATT, and FET) require processing data in a tabular format. Data owner can keep
their data in this format. Consequently, when central server requests for data, data owner can
respond readily. It is noteworthy that each data owner has to build the table only once. Thus,
pre-computation of the table enhances the efficiency of SAFETY.
Table 5 represents pre-computation table of data owner 1 for performing HWE, CATT, and FET at
rs4426.
Since performing LD involves two SNP loci, a different pre-computation table is required.
A sample pre-computation table for LD is given in supplementary document.
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Table 5: Sample pre-computation table for HWE, CATT, and FET
CC CT TT
Case Control Case Control Case Control
1 0 1 0 0 0
2 1 0
4 Discussions
In this section, we discuss some of the other security and privacy concerns regarding the secure
computation of GWAS in our hybrid model.
Query Privacy In the proposed methods, we do not consider the query privacy of the researcher.
In other words, we consider the queries from researcher to be public and data owners, central
servers know the targeted position (loci) from the researcher. This issue can be resolved by some
of the query privacy or private information retrieval techniques 25–27.
Output Privacy SAFETY does not guarantee the privacy of the final result as that only gets de-
crypted by researcher. We are aware that there are some differential privacy based approaches 16, 28, 29,
those address this issue and generate differentially private outputs for GWAS. However, as we con-
sider this researcher to be semi-honest, this issue is beyond the scope of the paper.
Consideration of Symmetric Cryptography We are not using symmetric cryptography (like
AES) for a couple of reasons:
• Achieving randomized encryption (initialization vector management issue): One major
drawback of using any symmetric cryptography scheme, (i.e., AES) is achieving randomized
or probabilistic encryption. This randomness can be introduced by choosing initialization
vectors which needs to be managed by the central server or CSP for multiple data owners.
However, SAFETY is based on homomorphic encryption whose encryption is probabilistic
by definition, which reduces the burden of managing initialization vectors.
• Risk of individual contribution leakage: One of the major concerns in addressing the
security of the federated environment is hiding the individual contributions from data owners.
As we perform the additions over encrypted data, these contributions are never revealed. As
a result, in our proposed framework the possibility of such leakage is highly unlikely.
• Requires n remote attestations (key distribution problem): Symmetric cryptography
schemes like AES require key distribution/setup with every data owners which results in
much network communications which might be prone to attack. On the contrary, our pro-
posed framework is based on public-key cryptography where the data owners use a public
key to encrypt their data published by the CSP. As a result, key distribution is much simpler
and our framework incurs less communication overhead.
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5 Conclusion
Homomorphic encryption and Intel SGX have their own strengths to utilize. Homomorphic en-
cryption can perform some computations without decrypting the ciphertext where Intel SGX can
perform any secure computation efficiently after decrypting ciphertext. However, a hybrid model
where homomorphic encryption and secure hardware are used in appropriate use cases provides a
good trade-off in terms of efficiency and computational support for secure statistical analysis. The
outstanding performance of SAFETY attests this hypothesis.
Recently, some data analytics and machine learning applications 13, 30, 31 have surfaced adopt-
ing Intel SGX for secure computation. However, there are no existing works that use Intel SGX
for analyzing genomic data. We think, using secure and efficient computation capability of Intel
SGX to analyze genomic data is very promising for healthcare and medical research.
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